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Chief Justice Dickson
and the Law of Restitution
John D. McCamus"
I. INTRODUCTION
THOUGH CHIEF JUSTICE DICKSON authored only a handful of opinions
relating to the law on restitution in his lengthy career as a member
of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is not too much to claim that those
opinions' have effected a major reshaping of the law of restitution of
the common law provinces. It will be argued here that in so doing,
Chief Justice Dickson has illuminated and reinvigorated a branch of
the law of obligations which had been neglected and little understood
in Canada and elsewhere during the 19th and early 20th centuries.
This may well be his most important and enduring contribution to our
private law. In order to defend claims such as these, it will be useful
to set the historical stage by providing a brief account of the central
ideas of the modem law of restitution and of the state of the Canadian
law of restitution immediately prior to the appointment of Chief
Justice Dickson to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1973.
A brief sketch of the modem history of the law of restitution must
begin with a reference to the publication of the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Restitution2 in 1937. Subtitled
"Quasi-Contract and Constructive Trusts," the Restatement offered a
. Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am indebted to Donna Glassman, a
member of the class of 1991 of Osgoode Hall Law School, for her research assistance
relating to this article.
1 Attention will be focused here on the five opinions identified in notes 13-15, infra.
There is an additional opinion, that in Guerin v. R. (1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, which touches
upon a restitutionary topic: fiduciary obligation. The principal contribution of that
opinion, however, relates to the law of aboriginal rights. Accordingly, it is considered at
length elsewhere in this symposium and will not be considered further here. As well,
attention is not given in this article to important restitution decisions of the Court -
such as Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil, (1976] 2 S.C.R. 347 - in which
the Chief Justice participated as a member of the panel but did not write a separate
opinion.
2 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi-Contracts and
Constructive Trusts (St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers, 1937).
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new analytical framework around which were to be organized the
detailed rules of the old common law of quasi-contract and a group of
equitable doctrines including, but by no means limited to, the
equitable rules relating to the constructive trust. The new analytical
framework was to be supplied by the principle against unjust
enrichment, a principle which was articulated in the first article of the
Restatement in the following terms:
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other.
According to the theory underlying the Restatement, quasi-contract
and constructive trust have more in common than their disparate
origins would suggest. Their commonality rests on the proposition that
both appear to represent applications of a broad underlying principle
against unjust enrichment. At one level, then, the Restatement of
Restitution can be seen simply as an exercise in the reorganization of
legal knowledge. That is to say, the authors of the Restatement were
attempting to provide for the law of restitution the useful service that
had been provided by earlier generations of scholars in contract and
tort by moving the organization and classification of the materials
constituting those subjects away from their foundations in the forms
of medieval procedural devices and reassembling them around a
coherent and intelligible analytical structure. As with its sister
restatements in contract and tort, the Restatement of Restitution was
not an exercise in radical reform of the content of the law. As its title
suggests, its principal objective was to effect a restatement of the
detailed and existing rules of the law of quasi-contract and construc-
tive trust.
At another level, however, it was apparent that the Restatement
project contained within it the seeds of significant reform. The authors
of the Restatement explicitly acknowledged their aspiration that the
very act of bringing these two subjects together and giving them a
coherent analytical structure would facilitate their further growth and
development.3 Quasi-contract had languished in obscurity in the
textbooks as an appendix or afterthought to the general law of
contracts. Constructive trusts had been treated, in the English
jurisprudence at least, as if it was essentially another type of
substantive trust. This association of quasi-contract and constructive
trust with their formidable private law cousins not only led to a lack
SW.A. Seavey & A.W. Scott, "Restitution" (1938) 54 L.Q. Rev. 29 at 29.
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of serious attention by the scholarly community, the association
became, in each case, a positive source of confusion. Thus, quasi-
contracts were thought to be real contracts, albeit implied, and
therefore were, in some respects at least, subject to doctrines
pertaining to the enforceability of genuine contracts." In the American
view, quasi-contracts were simply obligations imposed by law in order
to prevent an unjust enrichment and did not rest on an implied
contractual undertaking. Constructive trust, on the other hand, was
traditionally viewed as being akin to the express trust and thus
available only in "trust-like" situations, most obviously in the context
of fiduciary relationships. The American view of constructive trust was
that it was a remedial device rather than a substantive trust
institution. Moreover, it was considered to be a device imposed for the
purpose of preventing an unjust enrichment. To be sure, it could be
imposed in the context of fiduciary relations but it would be available
in other contexts as well. Thus, it was thought that the basic plan of
the Restatement - bringing these two subjects together within the
covers of one volume, freeing them from their confusing associations
with contract and trust and recognizing their commonality - would
provide a context within which these subjects could more effectively
benefit from the traditional common law methods of doctrinal
improvement and refinement than they had in the past. Recognition
of the unifying importance of the unjust enrichment principle would
serve, not merely as an instrument of reclassification or reorganiz-
ation, but as an important stimulus and rationale for reform of the
existing rules.
4 The classic illustration of this phenomenon is the decision of the House of Lords in
Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914] A.C. 398. The plaintiffs were held unable to recover in
quasi-contract monies deposited in an ultra vires banking business carried on by the
defendant building society. This result was justified, in part, on the basis that, "[tlhe
law cannot de jure impute promises to repay, whether for money had and received or
otherwise, which, if made de facto, it would inexorably avoid": supra at 452 per Lord
Sumner. On the implied contract theory, more generally, see IL Goff & G. Jones, The
Law of Restitution, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986) at 5-12.
Interestingly, in what would appear to be the only reported restitution decision
rendered by Chief Justice Dickson during his tenure in the Manitoba courts, Machray's
Department Store Ltd. v. Zionist Labour Organization, (1965) 53 D.L.R. (2d) 657 (Man.
Q.B.), Dickson J. effectively ignored the difficulties created by the Sinclair case and set
aside an ultra vires agreement on terms requiring that both parties be restored to their
original position. This decision is one of a substantial number of Canadian decisions
which (wisely, in my view) narrowly distinguish or ignore the Sinclair case. See,
generally, P.D. Maddaugh & J.D. McCamus, The Law of Restitution (Aurora, Ont.:
Canada Law Book Inc., 1990) c. 14.
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With a few notable exceptions, the Restatement model and, more
particularly, the unjust enrichment analysis were not warmly
embraced by the English judiciary.5 In Canada, a rather different
picture emerged.6 In 1954, in the leading decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada, Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada,7 the
Supreme Court explicitly adopted the unjust enrichment model in
granting recovery in quantum meruit for the value of services
rendered under an oral agreement which was unenforceable by reason
of its lack of formality. The defendant had argued that quantum
meruit relief required the implication of a contract and that such
implication was impossible where, as here, the parties had entered
into an explicit and unenforceable agreement. The Supreme Court,
relying explicitly on the Restatement, held that liability in such cases
rests on the unjust enrichment principle rather than on a theory of
implied contractual obligation. Subsequently, the unjust enrichment
notion was taken up with some enthusiasm by Canadian lower
courts s The Supreme Court itself returned to this theme about a
decade later. In its 1965 decision in County of Carleton v. City of
Ottawa,9 the Court considered whether to allow the plaintiff a
restitutionary claim for the value of payments it had mistakenly made
to a medical care facility. The plaintiff had mistakenly thought it was
under a statutory obligation to bear the costs of services provided to
a particular patient. In fact, the defendant municipality bore that
obligation. Accordingly, the payments had the unintended effect of
discharging a statutory obligation of the defendant municipality. No
similar claim for the value of a mistaken discharge of another's
obligation would have been allowable in English law. Nonetheless, the
5 For recent evidence of this lack of enthusiasm, see Orakpo v. Manson Investments,
[19781 A.C. 95 (H.L.) at 104 per Lord Diplock ("...there is no general doctrine of unjust
enrichment recognized in English law...."). Some prominent jurists took a different view.
See, generally, Goff & Jones, supra, note 4 at 10-16. Lord Wright, for example, was an
admirer of the Restatement. See Lord Wright, Legal Essays and Addresses (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1939). The famous passage from Lord Wright's opinion in
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe BarbourLtd., [1943] A.C. 32 at 63-
64, adopting the American view in a frustration case, has been quoted very frequently
in Canadian cases.
6 See, generally, Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note 4, c. 2.
[1954] S.C.R. 725.
8 The early experience is reviewed in W.H. Angus, 'Testitution in Canada Since the
Deglman Case" (1964) 42 Can. Bar Rev. 529.
o [1965] S.C.R. 663.
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Supreme Court granted relief relying, in part, on the unjust enrich-
ment analysis. During this same period, the law of "Restitution'
gained increasing attention in Canadian legal periodicals and began
to appear in the curricula of the law schools. 10 Canadian interest in
the subject was no doubt further stimulated by the appearance, in
1966, of a magisterial treatise on the English law of restitution by
Robert Goff and Gareth Jones." Indeed, given the holdings of the
Supreme Court in the Deglman and County of Carleton cases, it may
be that this splendid work found a more receptive audience in Canada
than in England where the unjust enrichment analysis continued to
be very much a minority taste.
At the time of Dickson J.A.'s elevation to the Supreme Court in
1973 - twenty years after the decision in Deglman - there was thus
strong, if not overwhelming, evidence of Canadian acceptance of the
American unjust enrichment analysis. Although there was a growing
body of case law adopting this approach in the lower courts, there
were nonetheless' only two decisions of the Supreme Court on point,
one per decade. Further, those two decisions, important as they might
be, both dealt with matters of quasi-contract. There had been no clear
pronouncement of the Court in favour of the unjust enrichment
analysis on the equity side of the ledger. Further, there was little
concrete evidence of the extent to which the Court viewed the unjust
enrichment principle as an instrument of reform. The result in
Deglman was not controversial. To be sure, the change effected in
County of Carleton was a matter of some significance but, in the
traditional common law manner, the significance of that change was
masked by reasoning which purported to demonstrate that the holding
was not inconsistent with earlier English authority. 2 In short, for
those who believed that adoption of the unjust enrichment analysis
would facilitate a much needed modernization of Canadian restitu-
10 Some credit at least for these developments is due to Bradley Crawford, a former
student of Robert Goffs at the L.S.E., whose pioneering efforts as a teacher and a
scholar of restitution at the University of Toronto (and, one might add, as a head-note
writer for the D.L.R.'s) generated much interest in the subject. See, e.g., B.E. Crawford,
Restitution: Cases and Notes ( Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1971) [unpub-
lished].
" R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1966). A
second edition appeared in 1978 and a third in 1986.
12 See, e.g., Mayor v. Pine (1825), 3 Bing. 285; Gray v. Hill (1820) Ry. & M. 420. For
earlier Canadian authority to the same effect, see Giles v. McEwan (1896), 11 Man. L.R.
150; Re Meston, [19251 4 D.L.R. 887 (Sask. CAk).
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tionary law, the evidence in the case law at that time was encouraging
but hardly dispositive.
If, almost twenty years later, one can conclude with some confi-
dence that such a change has occurred, the explanation for this
development rests in significant measure on the contribution to this
subject made by Chief Justice Dickson during his tenure on the
Supreme Court. The principal evidence in support of this proposition
is to be found in Chief Justice Dickson's opinions in, firstly, a series
of cases dealing with the distribution of property upon the dissolution
of a marriage or similar relationship; i" secondly, a dissenting opinion
in which the Chief Justice sought to overrule the doctrine denying the
recovery of moneys paid under a mistake of law;1 and thirdly, the
majority opinion which he delivered in the recent decision of the Court
in Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada" which offers
compelling evidence of the Chief Justice's view of the expansive role
to be played by the unjust enrichment principle in Canadian restitu-
tionary law. To each of these topics, we may now turn.
II. THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY CASES
IT IS WELL KNOWN that in his majority opinion in Pettkus v. Becker, 6
Chief Justice Dickson developed an innovative solution for a set of
problems arising in the context of matrimonial property disputes. The
principal difficulty inherent in the prior law is well illustrated by the
decision of the Court in Murdoch v. Murdoch 7 in 1973. In that case,
and indeed in many of the other Canadian authorities on this point,
a recurring factual pattern is to be found. The parties to the litigation
are a husband and wife, typically a farming couple, who have worked
together in the traditional manner of such couples to develop what
might be referred to as a family business. Often, however, title to the
principal asset of importance, the farm, would be taken in the name
of the husband alone. Upon dissolution of the relationship, though the
husband might be subject to continuing support obligations of one
kind or another, the traditional view taken by the legal system was
13 Rathwell v. Rathwell, (1978] 2 S.C.R. 436; Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834;
Sorochan v. Sorochan, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38.
'4 Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 347.
15 (1989] 1 S.C.R. 426.
1 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 67.
17 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423.
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that the husband remained the exclusive owner of the asset held in
his name. If the wife had made a cash contribution to the purchase
price of the property, the traditional doctrine of resulting trust would
confer a pro rata equitable interest in the asset upon the wife,
provided that the husband could not establish that the contribution
was intended as a gift."8 Considerable difficulty would be encoun-
tered, however, in attempting to apply the resulting trust analysis to
situations where the contribution of the spouse without title might be
said to be indirect. Thus, where the contribution took the form of
paying for other household or family expenses or, as in Murdoch, of
providing services necessary to the operation of a business on the
property, the absence of a clear link between the plaintiffs contribu-
tion and the acquisition of the asset in question rendered the
application of resulting trust analysis highly problematic. Although
occasional attempts were made by English judges to extend trust
doctrine into situations where the plaintiff wife's contribution might
be said to be indirect,"9 the House of Lords reaffirmed, in Pettitt v.
Pettitt0 and Gissing v. Gissing, the traditional view that the
resulting trust analysis was available to the wife in cases of indirect
contribution only where both parties intended that the wife would
acquire an interest in the property in question. Explicit understand-
ings of this kind are, of course, likely to be rare. Though it was no
doubt true that judges minded to effect a just distribution of property
in such circumstances would be inclined to "find" such understand-
ings,2 the formal doctrine propounded by the House of Lords offered
no comfort to such bold judicial spirits. In Murdoch v. Murdoch," the
Supreme Court adhered to the traditional rule. Relying on Pettitt and
Gissing, the Court denied the plaintiff wife an interest in the farm on
which she had laboured with her husband for many years by reason
of the absence of such an understanding. The Supreme Court was,
18 See, generally, B. Hovius & T.G. Youdan, The Law of Family Property (Toronto:
Carswell, 1991) c. 5 & 6.
'9 See, e.g., Hazell v. Hazell, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 301 (CA). For an account of more recent
English experience, see Hovius & Youdan, ibid., c. 8.
20 [1970] A.C. 777 (H.L.).
2 [19711 A.C. 886 (ILL.).
' A point made by Professor Waters in an influential article: see D. Waters, "Matrimo-
nial Property Disputes: Resulting and Constructive Trusts: Restitution" (1975) 53 Can.
Bar Rev. 366.
2Supra, note 17.
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however, divided in Murdoch. A dissenting opinion was filed by Laskin
J. Though it is true that the majority in Murdoch offered an orthodox
interpretation of the applicable doctririe, it is doubtless the case that
the dissent of Laskin J..better reflected evolving social attitudes and
expectations with respect to the resolution of disputes of this kind. In
his dissent, Laskin J. made the intriguing and ingenious suggestion
that the wife might be entitled, in such a case, to be awarded an
interest in the property by means of a constructive trust imposed on
the husband in order to prevent his unjust enrichment.
Five years after rendering its decision in Murdoch, the Supreme
Court returned to these questions in Rathwell v. Rathwell.24 On this
occasion, Dickson J. pursued the line of analysis intimated by Laskin
J. in Murdoch. In a passage which is typical of his style of opinion-
writing, the nature of the problem is described in a candid and
accessible manner:
In broad terms matrimonial property disputes are much alike, differing only in detail.
Matrimonial property, i.e. property acquired during matrimony (I avoid the term "family
assets" with its doctrinal connotations) is ordinarily the subject-matter of the conflict.
One or other, or both, of the spouses may have contributed financially to the purchase.
One or other may have contributed freely given labour. The contribution may have been
direct, or indirect in the sense of permitting the acquisition of an asset which would
otherwise not have been acquired. Such an indirect contribution may have been in
money, or it may have been in other forms as, for example, through caring for the home
and family. The property is acquired during a period when there is marital accord.
When this gives way to discord, problems arise in respect of property division. There is
seldom prior express agreement. There is rarely implied agreement or common
intention, apart from the general intention of building a life together. It is not in the
nature of things for young married people to contemplate the break-up of their marriage
and the division, in that event, of assets acquired by common effort during wedlock.'
Dickson J. went on to observe that although the body of judicial
doctrine that had developed to resolve such disputes appeared to be
in an "uncertain and unstable state," there was, nonetheless, "a
certain inevitability about this in family law matters. The economic
and human variables in a society are bound to be diffuse."26 It is
evident, however, that Dickson J. had come to the conclusion that the
level of instability obtaining in the present context was unattractive.
Indeed, in characteristically colourful prose he described the debate
24 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436.
25 ibid, at 447-48.
26 Ibid. at 448.
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being waged on these matters in the law reports and in the law
reviews in the following terms:
This appeal affords the Court an opportunity of again considering the juridical basis for
the resolution of matrimonial property disputes. The settlement of such disputes has
beer bedevilled by conflicting doctrine and a continuing struggle between the "justice
and equity" school, with Rimmer v. Rimmer, the leading case and Lord Denning the
dominant exponent, and the "intent" school, reflected in several of the speeches
delivered in the House of Lords in Pettitt v. Pettitt and Gissing v. Gissing, and in the
judgment of this Court in Murdoch v. Murdoch. The charge raised against the former
school is that of dispensing "palm-tree" justice; against the latter school, that of
meaningless ritual in searching for a phantom intent.
Thus, there was a need for renewed stability in this area but, in
Dickson J.'s view, not a stability which would be purchased by the
creation of rigid rules which would impair the courts' ability to fashion
a just result in the particular case.
The need for certainty in matrimonial property disputes is unquestionable, but it is a
certainty of legal principle hedging in ajudicial discretion capable of redressinginjustice
and relieving oppression.'
In addition to the need to find an appropriate balance between
certainty and flexibility, Dickson J. addressed explicitly the need to
take into account changing social attitudes:
Many factors, legal and non-legal, have emerged to modify the position of earlier days.
Among these factors are a more enlightened attitude toward the status of women,
altered life-styles, dynamic socio-economic changes. Increasingly, the work of a woman
in the management of the home and rearing of the children, as wife and mother, is
recognized as an economic contribution to the family unit."
For critics of the Court's decision in Murdoch"° such an open acknow-
ledgement of the reality of these social forces and their relevance to
the issues in dispute must have seemed both refreshing and reassur-
ing.
Having defined the problems created for judicial craftsmanship by
matrimonial disputes in these rather challenging terms, Dickson J.
then turned to consider possible solutions. His attention was first
21 Ibid. at 442-43.
2 8 Ibid. at 448.
2 9 Ibid. at 443.
s Supra, note 17.
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turned to the resulting trust analysis which, predictably, was found
to be inadequate to the task at hand. To the extent that resulting
trust requires "agreement or common intention" by both parties, such
a state of mind may be absent. In such circumstances, Dickson J.
stated, it is necessary to turn to the doctrine of constructive trust.
Dickson J. began his analysis of the constructive trust device with a
ringing endorsement of the American unjust enrichment theory of
constructive trust:
The constructive trust amounts to a third head of obligation, quite distinct from contract
and tort, in which the court subjects "a person holding title to property...to an equitable
duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it';....The constructive trust is an obligation of great elasticity and
generality."1
In this passage, Dickson J. adopted the American tripartite division
of the law of obligations into tort, contract and restitution.32 As well,
he adopted the American theory that constructive trust is a remedial
device available in cases of unjust enrichment and not, as it is in the
prevailing English view, a substantive trust institution in some sense.
Dickson J. then turned to consider the possible application of
constructive trust analysis to the matrimonial property question. For
readers familiar with the American restitutionary doctrine, this was
an exercise of enormous interest for there was, at that time, no body
of American doctrine applying the constructive trust analysis to such
situations.3 Dickson J. identified the causal relationship between the
plaintiffs efforts and the defendant's acquisition of the asset in
dispute as the critical linchpin of his analysis. He explained as follows:
Where a common intention is clearly lacking and cannotbe presumed, but a spouse does
contribute to family life, the court has the difficult task of deciding whether there is any
causal connection between the contribution and the disputed asset. It has to assess
whether the contribution was such as enabled the spouse with title to acquire the asset
in dispute. That will be a question of fact to be found in the circumstances of the
particular case. If the answer is affirmative, then the spouse with title becomes
accountable as a constructive trustee. The court will assess the contributions made by
31 Supra, note 24 at 454.
" A similar view had been expressed by Lord Wright in the oft-quoted passage from his
judgement in the Fibrosa case referred to supra, note 5.
3" A short time before the Court decided Rathwell, however, a similar view was taken
by a California court in Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. 815, 557 P. 2d 106 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1976). See also"Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin
v. Marvin" (1977) 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1708.
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each spouse and make a fair, equitable distribution having regard to the respective
contributions. The relief is part of the equitable jurisdiction of the court and does not
depend on evidence of intention."'
Not one to shy away from difficult issues, Dickson J. then proceeded
to formulate an explanation of the underlying rationale of the unjust
enrichment principle and, more than this, provided a reformulation of
the general principle itself in his own terms.
The constructive trust, as so envisaged, comprehends the imposition of trust machinery
by the court in order to achieve a result consonant with good conscience. As a matter
of principle, the court will not allow any man unjustly to appropriate to himself the
value earned by the labours of another. That principle is not defeated by the existence
of a matrimonial relationship between the parties; but, for the principle to succeed, the
facts must display an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, and the absence of any
juristic reason - such as a contract or disposition of law - for the enrichment"M
For those who might take the view that the recognition of equitable
interests in land created by the provision of personal services on a,
presumably, accumulating basis might pose problems for convey-
ancers, Dickson J. offered little solace.
The emergence of the constructive trust in matrimonial property disputes reflects a
diminishing preoccupation with the formalities of real property law and individual
property rights and the substitution of an attitude more in keeping with the realities
of contemporary family life. The manner in which title is registered may, or may not,
be of significance in determining beneficial ownership.'
Few readers were surprised, one suspects, to find that Dickson J. went
on to hold that on the facts of this case, the constructive trust analysis
was available to the plaintiff. In Dickson J.'s view, the defendant
should be taken to hold as constructive trustee for his wife an
undivided half-interest in the farm which was, in some sense, a
product of their joint effort and teamwork.
The Rathwell opinion was surely a bold and impressive exercise in
judicial craftsmanship and statesmanship. At the doctrinal level, it
proposed nothing less than a major sea-change in the theoretical
underpinnings of constructive trust. At the level of social policy, it
proposed a reversal of the position quite recently Laken by the same
Court in the Murdoch case on an issue of very considerable public
34 Supra, note 24 at 454-55.
33 Ibid. at 455.
-6 Ibid. at 456.
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interest. It is understandable that more conservative judicial spirits
would have preferred to await legislative treatment of what might be
viewed as a politically sensitive and rather complex subject. Perhaps
it is not surprising, therefore, that in Rathwell Dickson J. carried a
plurality but not a majority of the Court on these questions. The
plaintiff had in fact made a cash contribution to the acquisition of the
disputed asset. Accordingly, a clear majority of the Court took the
position that the resulting trust analysis provided a satisfactory basis
for the granting of relief in this case. At this juncture, then, Canadian
admirers of the unjust enrichment analysis were left on the edge of
their proverbial seats. For reasons understandable, if somewhat
alarming, the fate of the unjust enrichment analysis of the remedial
constructive trust appeared to have become linked with a boldly
innovative and potentially very controversial view adopted by Dickson
J. with respect to the resolution of matrimonial property disputes. No
doubt there is some exhilaration in finding one's pet legal theory at
centre stage in an important debate concerning a social issue of some
prominence. There is, on the other hand, some risk involved.
A definitive treatment of the point was, however, not long in
forthcoming. The Court returned to these questions in 1980 in Pettkus
v. Becker37 and on this occasion, Dickson J. carried a clear majority
of the Court. In his reasons for judgment, Dickson J. covered the same
jurisprudential terrain explored in Rathwell in more or less the same
terms. The principle against unjust enrichment was again restated in
terms of "benefit," "detriment" and the absence of a "juristic reason"
for the enrichment." The plaintiff was awarded relief in the form of
a constructive trust imposed on an undivided half-interest in a series
of properties acquired in the defendants name during a lengthy period
of cohabitation and joint entrepreneurial activity relating to those
properties. On the theoretical point, the majority opinion was very
clear in its adoption of the unjust enrichment model of the remedial
constructive trust. Interestingly, though, in Pettkus Dickson J. linked
this view of constructive trust with the somewhat similar view of the
quasi-contractual action in money had and received taken by Lord
Mansfield more than two centuries before in Moses v. Macferlan.39
3 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.
"
8Ibid. at 848.
31 (1760), 2 Burr. 1005, 97 E.R. 581 (K.B.).
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The principle of unjust enrichment lies at the heart of the constructive trust. "Unjust
enrichment" has played a role in Anglo-American legal writing for centuries. Lord
Mansfield, in the case of Moses v. Macferlan, put the matter in these words: "...the gist
of this kind of action is that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is
obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." It would be
undesirable, and indeed impossible, to attempt to define all the circumstances in which
an unjust enrichment might arise... The great advantage of ancient principles of equity
is their flexibility: the judiciary is thus able to shape these malleable principles so as
to accommodate the changing needs and mores of society, in order to achieve justice.
The constructive trust has proven to be a useful tool in the judicial armoury.'
The dissenting opinion of Martland J. confirms that this linkage of
common law quasi-contract and equitable constructive trust under the
unjust enrichment banner was indeed a point of controversy within
the Court. It was Martland J.'s view that while the unjust enrichment
principle might provide a satisfactory analysis of the quasi-contract
cases, it would introduce an element of undesirable uncertainty into
the analysis of cases of constructive trust.41 It is possible, of course,
that it was the somewhat novel application of the constructive trust
concept being proposed by the majority that provoked Martland J.'s
rejection of the unjust enrichment analysis of the constructive trust.
It may well be that if the Pettkus minority had been asked to consider
the utility of the unjust enrichment analysis in the context of a more
orthodox application of constructive trust doctrine, opposition of this
kind to its utility might have dissipated. In any event, the majority
view in Pettkus both confirmed and provided a striking illustration of
the role to be played by the unjust enrichment principle in the context
of constructive trust cases.
Once it is accepted that unjust enrichment provides an attractive
analytical framework for both quasi-contract and constructive trust,
a number of intriguing issues surface for consideration. One might
consider, for example, whether recognition of the commonality of these
two subjects might lead to a merging of their remedial schemes in the
sense that equitable remedies might now become available for what
were initially common law causes of action and vice versa. If the
various restitutionary causes of action of both common law and
equitable origin rest on the same underlying principle, could one not
argue that once a claim for unjust enrichment is established, whatever
its historical pedigree, a court could then select the most appropriate
remedy from the entire battery of common law and equitable unjust
,' Supra, note 37 at 847-48.
4 Ibid. at 856-59.
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enrichment remedies and make it available to the plaintiff? A
traditionalist would be inclined to deny such a possibility. Equitable
remedies are, by their very nature, available only for breaches of
duties imposed by equity. On the other hand, it is difficult to discern
a principled basis for precluding altogether cross-fertilization of this
kind. To place this issue in the context of the matrimonial property
cases, one might consider whether the cause of action recognized in
Pettkus v. Becker, presumably equitable by nature, might give rise to
some remedy other than the constructive trust. In Deglman v.
Guaranty Trust,42 it will be recalled, a nephew who provided services
to his aunt on the faith of an oral and therefore unenforceable promise
that she would leave property to him in her will, was allowed to
recover in a common law claim for quantum meruit for the value of
services rendered when, in due course, it became apparent that the
aunt had not performed her promise. Could such a remedy be awarded
in the context of the kinds of claims allowed in the Pettkus line of
authority?
This intriguing issue was addressed by Dickson C.J.C. in the later
decision in Sorochan v. Sorochan.s Here, again, the familiar fact
pattern was repeated. The plaintiff farm wife sought to impose a
constructive trust on the farm property, title to which was held
exclusively by her husband. The judgement appealed from held that
since the husband had owned the property prior to the commencement
of cohabitation, the Pettkus principle was inapplicable. That principle
was said to rest on the making of a contribution to the acquisition of
the asset in dispute. The Supreme Court had no difficulty in holding
that since the plaintiffs services, rendered over a period of some forty-
two years and often without the assistance of her husband, had
enabled the farm to be "maintained and preserved as valuable
farmland"" and that such a contribution was sufficient to engage the
doctrine of constructive trust.45 More importantly for present pur-
poses, Dickson C.J.C., for the Court, indicated that in such a case,
once a court has determined that an unjust enrichment has occurred,
it must then turn to a second question relating to the selection of the
most appropriate remedy. For the Chief Justice, it was clear that in
a matrimonial property dispute the plaintiff would not be limited to
4 2 SUpra, note 7.
43 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38.
44 Ibid. at 45.
'5Ibid. at 50-51.
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constructive trust relief. "Other remedies, such as monetary damages,
may also be available to rectify situations of unjust enrichment.""6
Having thus opened up a new realm of remedial possibilities, Dickson
C.J.C. went on to consider whether, on the facts of the Sorochan case,
the more appropriate remedy would be the proprietary remedy of
constructive trust rather than a claim for monetary relief. A number
of factors were identified by the Chief Justice as a basis for reaching
the conclusion that proprietary relief was indeed the more appropriate
remedy.47 First, a clear link had been established between the
services performed by the wife and the maintenance of the value of
the particular asset. Second, Dickson C.J.C. viewed it to be material
that Mrs. Sorochan had a reasonable expectation of obtaining an
interest in the land. Finally, the longevity of the relationship of the
parties was said to constitute "a further compelling factor in favour of
granting proprietary relief."'8 Although one might have reservations
about one or another of these criteria,49 it should be emphasized that
the significant contribution offered by the Sorochan opinion is simply
that the remedial possibilities in such cases are opened up and the
legitimacy of a reasoned analysis of the basis for awarding different
kinds of restitutionary remedies is established.0
4 Ibid. at 47.
4 7 Ibid. at 51-53.
4s Ibid. at 53.
4, See, e.g., J.D. McCamus, 'The Role of Proprietary Relief in the Modern Law of
Restitution" in F. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures (1987) (Montreal: Les Editions
Yvon Blais, 1989) 141 at 155-57. As a general matter, the factors identified by the Chief
Justice do not appear to be capable of explaining or justifying the granting of proprie-
tary relief in contexts other than matrimonial property cases. Within the matrimonial
property context, the introduction of the "reasonable expectation" test appears to run
the risk of reintroducing, in another form, the type of intention test that was so
disparaged by Dickson J. in Rathwell. See generally Hovius & Youdan, supra, note 18
at 123-24; Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note 4 at 664-68.
' This general topic is further explored by LaForest J. in Lac Minerals Ltd. v.
International Corona Resources Ltd., [198912 S.C.R. 574 at 675-78. For discussion of La
Forest J.'s views, see J.D. McCamus, "Restitution and the Supreme Court: The Continu-
ing Progress of the Unjust Enrichment Principle" (1991) 2 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 505. For
discussion of the particular question of the availability of proprietary relief in the
context of breach of fiduciary duty, see T.G. Youdan, "The Fiduciary Principle: The
Applicability of Proprietary Remedies" in T.G. Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and
Trusts (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 93; J.D. McCamus, "Remedies for Breach of Fiduci-
ary Duty" in 1990 Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto:
Richard De Boo, 1991) 57.
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In this important trio of opinions, then, a number of important
contributions to the law of restitution are manifest. First, there can be
no doubt but that these cases have the cumulative effect of recognizing
the existence of a new cause of action relating to the division of assets
upon dissolution of a marriage. While the precise elements of this
cause of action will undoubtedly be the subject of further judicial and
scholarly analysis,5 a comparison of these cases with the earlier
decision of the Court in Murdoch v. Murdoch52 plainly establishes
this point. Secondly, by recognizing the remedial nature of the
constructive trust device and linking it to the application of the unjust
enrichment principle, the Chief Justice embraced the equitable half of
the American Restatement project. Those who, like myself, believe that
the unjust enrichment analysis is helpful in illuminating these
otherwise rather dark corners of our private law of obligations will
view this as a most significant development. Further, by divorcing the
question of remedial choice from the exercise of recognizing the
existence of an unjust enrichment cause of action in particular
circumstances, the Chief Justice has legitimated a new and fruitful
line of enquiry. Indeed, it is possible that he has provided the means
by which, at long last, a fusion or merger of the doctrines of common
law and equity in this area may be achieved. Finally, these opinions
articulate, in memorable fashion, an elegant statement of the unjust
enrichment principle and its underlying rationale. As we shall see, it
is possible that the Dickson reformulation of the general principle may
yet serve as a generalized statement of the restitutionary cause of
action.
III. MISTAKEN PAYMENTS AND THE MISTAKE OF LAW RULE
ONE OF THE CENTRAL TOPICS of the old law of quasi-contracts is the
recovery of moneys paid under a mistake. As is well known, the
traditional rule was that moneys paid under mistake of fact are
normally recoverable. 3 At the same time, however, it is generally
understood that where payments are made under a mistake of law,
they cannot be recovered. This latter and much criticized proposition
stems from a statement of Lord Ellenborough C.J. in Bilbie v. Lumley
51 See, e.g., Hovius & Youdan, supra, note 18, c. 7; Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note
4, c. 27D.
52 Supra, note 17.
" See, generally, Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note 4, c. 10.
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et al.14 in 1802. The Supreme Court was provided with an opportun-
ity to reconsider the mistake of law rule in 1982 in Hydro Electric
Commission of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro."5 In that case, the plaintiff
municipal utility sought to recover payments made to Ontario Hydro
under a scheme whereby Ontario Hydro had charged newer utilities
a surcharge for the electricity supplied to them. The surcharge was
intended by Hydro to represent a contribution to the capital structure
of the Hydro system. Older municipal utilities, which had contributed
to the cost of building the Hydro system over a longer period of time,
received a so-called "return on equity" in the form of a reduction of
what they would otherwise have been obliged to pay Hydro for the
power supplied to them. The surcharge imposed on the newer utilities,
referred to as a "cost of return," was thus in effect passed on as a rate
reduction to the older utilities. When the plaintiff utility formed the
opinion, which was ultimately held to be valid by the Supreme Court,
that Ontario Hydro possessed no statutory power to impose a
surcharge of this kind, the plaintiff brought an action to recover the
moneys paid over the previous eight years. From a moral perspective,
this might appear to be a rather compelling claim. As Dickson J. said
in his dissenting judgment:
To the layman, the issue would be a clear one. Nepean should succeed. Good conscience
and plain honesty would require Hydro to repay. To the lawyer trying to follow confused
and contradictory authority the matter is not that simple."
The problem, of course, is that the money in this instance has been
paid under mistake of law and, indeed, it was on this basis that the
majority 7 of the Court in Nepean denied relief. In a persuasively
written dissenting opinion, however, Dickson J. indicated that the
mistake of law rule should be overturned and that money paid under
a mistake should be recoverable, as a general proposition, whether the
mistake was one of law or fact.
Drawing on the extensive law review and textual literature dealing
with this subject, almost all of which is hostile to the mistake of law
rule, Dickson J. mounted a withering attack on Bilbie v. Lumley et al.
itself and on the general rule said to be based upon it. As others have
(1802), 2 East 469, 102 E.R. 448. And see Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note 4, c.
11.
(1982] 1 S.C.R 347.
56 Ibid. at 349.
5 Estey J., with Martland and Lamer JJ. concurring.
The Law of Restitution 355
noted, Lord Ellenborough's statement in that case represented amisguided importation of the ignorantia juris maxim from the
criminal law context into that of the civil law. The statement was
uttered in ignorance of the existence of "a line of precedents running
back two hundred years.""' The doctrine is, itself, a "monstrous
mistake of law made by Lord Ellenborough." s Moreover, Lord
Ellenborough himself allowed recovery some years later in a mistake
of law case and opined that when "it is established, as it clearly is,
that a mistake in point of fact may also destroy it, it seems difficult
upon principle to say that a mistake in point of law, clearly evidenced
by what occurs at the time of cancelling should not have the same
operation."" Dickson J. went on to observe that the distinction in the
treatment of mistakes of fact and those of law lacks a policy founda-
tion. Although the rule is sometimes justified on the basis that it is
conducive to certainty, it was Dickson J.'s view that "[c]ertainty in
commerce and in public transactions would seem to be better served
by the non-recognition of a rule which sows confusion and which has
so little to recommend it."61 The confusion results, as he noted, not
only from the inherent difficulty in distinguishing mistakes of fact
from mistakes of law but, also, from the development of a long list of
exceptions to the general rule, many of which lack clear definition.
Thus, Dickson J. was particularly critical of the exception related to
mistakes of "private rights" and the distinction between "general law"
and "private rights" upon which it rests.62
A fine illustration of the difficulty inherent in applying many of the
exceptions to the general rule to a particular fact situation can be
found in the attempted application of one of these exceptions in the
Nepean case itself. The courts below had come to the conclusion that
although the payments had been made under a mistake of law,
Ontario Hydro, as the party having principal responsibility for the
administration of its enabling legislation, was not inpari delicto with
the plaintiff and ought therefore to restore the moneys paid. This
exception would appear to have been invented in an earlier decision
8 Supra, note 54 at 358 per Dickson J.
8 Ibid. at 369, quoting E.W. Patterson, "Improvements in the Law of Restitution7 (1954-
55) 40 Cornell L.Q. 667 at 676.
60 Ibid. at 358, quoting from Lord Ellenborough's judgment in Perrott and Others v.
Perrott (1811), 14 East 423 at 440, 104 E.R. 665 at 671.
"1Ibid. at 363.
62 Ibid. at 365-66.
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of the Supreme Court"3 and, if one accepts that the invention of this
exception was legitimate, the exception would indeed appear to apply
to this fact situation. In the majority opinion of the Court in Nepean,
however, it was held that the in pari delicto exception was not
available to the plaintiff in the present case.
Dickson J. then turned to consider the proper basis or explanation
for the denial of relief in some of the mistake of law cases. Apparently
much influenced on this point by the leading English text on the law
of restitution" and by similar sentiments expressed in the Restate-
ment of Restitution," Dickson J. suggested that the real reason why
relief is denied in cases like Bilbie v. Lumley et al. is because the
money has been paid "in settlement of an honest claim."66 Payment
made in these circumstances is irrecoverable, even if later events
indicate that the payor was foolish to have acceded to the request for
payment. But, of course, this reason for denying relief might also
apply in cases where payments are made on the basis of a factual
error. Accordingly, the method of reform which appealed to Dickson
J. was that adopted by Article 44 of the Restatement of Restitution
67
- simple abolition of distinction between mistakes of fact and
mistakes of law. This was, he said, a better approach to reform than
"increasing the number of exceptions engrafted on the rule and which
have already, to a great extent, emasculated the rule.' ' 3
As a set piece of common law reasoning, the foregoing analysis set
forth by Dickson J. in Nepean would stand on its own merits. An ill-
conceived rule spawns a host of confusing exceptions. The general rule
is misconceived in the sense that it bears no direct relationship to the
real reason for denying relief in the cases to which it properly applies.
The rule is restated by recasting the general rule in the form of the
underlying rationale. Thus reformulated, the old version of the rule
63 Although there are a number of well established "not in pari delicto" exceptions to the
general rule, the suggestion that public authorities are per se subject to this exception
with respect to the interpretation and application of their enabling legislation appears
to have been the invention of the Supreme Court in Eadie v. The Corporation of the
Township of Brantford, [1967] S.C.R. 573.
' Dickson J. referred to the discussion to be found in I. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of
Restitution, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978) 91.
65 Supra, note 2 at 181-86.
66 [1982] 1 S.C.R. 347 at 364, per Dickson J.
7 Supra, note 2 at 181.
(1982] 1 S.C.R. 347 at 369-70.
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and its many exceptions can be discarded. By such means, however
rarely they might be deployed, the common law evolves and renews
itself. To make an argument such as this, then, it is not self-evident
that one needs to rely on the unjust enrichment principle. It is
therefore of interest in the present context that Dickson J. apparently
viewed the unjust enrichment principle as an important element in his
analysis. In setting forth his diagnosis of the basic problem with the
mistake of law rule, Dickson J. observed that its popularity "was no
doubt due in part to its coincidence with the beginning of a "period of
rigidity in contract law" as Professor Waddams has called it, which
also saw the suppression of the law of restitution. .. " Failure to
think clearly about the mistake of law problem, he appears to suggest,
is part and parcel of a general failure of the courts during the 19th
century to develop coherent rules relating to restitutionary issues.
In an era in which increasing attention is being paid to the analysis
of restitutionary problems, the mistake of law doctrine thus becomes
vulnerable to change. Accordingly, after discussing a number of the
exceptions which have developed to that rule, Dickson J. commented
as follows:
Finally, the most significant judicial development in the area of mistake of law is not
an exception or qualification to the rule but rather the resurgence in English and
Canadian jurisprudence of the doctrine of restitution or unjust (or unjustified)
enrichment... Once a doctrine of restitution or unjust enrichment is recognized, the
distinction as to mistake of law and mistake of fact becomes simply meaningless.0
Further, in expressing the view that the payments made under
mistake of law should be treated in a similar fashion to those paid
under mistake of fact, Dickson J. made the following observation:
Goff and Jones suggest the general test, which I would adopt, that the money should be
returned if, on general principles of equity, it would be unjust to allow the recipient of
the benefit to retain it. In short, the question of mistake of law should be seen as just
one more category in the general law of unjust enrichment. If the defendant has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, then he should be forced to disgorge
the benefit."'
so Ibid. at 359, quoting S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts (Aurora: Canada Law
Book, 1977) 213.
7 0 Ibid. at 367-68.
71 (1982] 1 S.C.R. 347 at 364.
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For Dickson J., then, it appears that the modern Canadian embrace
of the unjust enrichment analysis is an important part of the
explanation for the fact that the time is ripe for a reconsideration of
so well-entrenched a rule as that which denies recovery of moneys
paid under mistake of law. If the unjust enrichment analysis provides
a context within which to effect such a reconsideration, however, we
ought not conclude from the opinion of Dickson J. in Nepean that mere
incantation of the principle constitutes the sum and substance of that
reconsideration. On the contrary, invocation of the principle is
accompanied here with a powerful critique of the old general rule. Its
deficiencies are catalogued at length. The true basis for denying relief
in cases where it has been applied with good reason is identified and
embedded in the newly restated version of the rile. This kind of
doctrinal shift is not unknown, of course, in other areas of private law.
It would appear, however, that the Chief Justice shares the view
expressed by the authors of the Restatement" and by many others
that modification and evolution of this kind may be expected to occur
more frequently in an area such as this which has been so ignored and
misunderstood in the English jurisprudence.
Although Dickson J. did not carry a majority on these issues in the
Nepean case, it is not clear that his views were rejected by the
majority on their merits. Estey J., who wrote for the majority,
evidently felt that Dickson J. was dealing with matters which had not
been properly raised by the appellant. He stated:
The thrust of the appellants submission was centred on the question as to whether the
parties to the mistake of law were in pari delicto. Unjust enrichment is mentioned in
its factum only with reference to the argument that the appellant and the respondent
were not in pari delicto. In the course of argument the appellant, in response to a
question from the Court, stated that it was not urging and not founding its appeal on
the abolition of the distinction in law between mistake of fact and mistake of law.
Indeed, the rule was accepted... Accordingly my considerations have been confined to the
operation of the doctrine of mistake of law as argued."73
In denying relief, then, the majority did rest its decision on the
general rule against recovery of monies paid under mistake of law. In
doing so, however, the majority did not explicitly reject the analysis
offered by Dickson J. in dissent.
It may well be that the Nepean majority felt that the application of
the traditional rule could be justified in the particular case of
72 Supra, note 2.
73 Ibid. at 412.
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payments made to public authorities. There is a hint to this effect in
the majority opinion. Having noted that the parties had not raised the
question of abolishing the mistake of law rule, Estey J. went on to
observe as follows:
This course may well have been taken by both counsel because of the nature of the
statutes (concerned with the generation and distribution of electricity to the inhabitants
throughout the province, at cost) and the nature of the contending bodies. Each party
is a public body 'owned' by the people of the province in the one case and by the
Township in the other (the latter, of course, participate in each organization). Neither
has the authority to 'accumulate' surplus assets or resources. The concept of unjust
enrichment is not easily associated with these relationships.'
Certainly, the practical problems that might be associated with the
unwinding of a prolonged and substantial exercise in revenue
collection and redistribution appeared to trouble the courts below.
Craig J., at trial,7" had come to the conclusion that in a case of this
kind, money would normally be recoverable on the basis that the
plaintiff was not in pari delicto with the defendant, but that recovery
should not be allowed for three reasons in the present case. First,
Craig J. reasoned that Ontario Hydro had not in fact received a
benefit.76 It had passed on payments or credits received to the older
municipalities through the device of the "return on equity." Second, it
was Craig J.'s view that Ontario Hydro could only recover the amount
required to satisfy any judgement granted in favour of the plaintiff by
increasing its charges against all municipalities and utilities. Thus,
those who had been overcharged already would be required to pay a
further surcharge. In short, it would be impossible to restore the
status quo ante.7' The third reason offered by Craig J. for denying
relief was that the plaintiff utility "had ample opportunity to investi-
gate its legal rights and take legal advice in the first year or two of
the system - rather than waiting eight years."7 " Although this did
not constitute grounds for application of the doctrines of either
estoppel or acquiesence, Craig J. felt that this was an "equity" that
weighed in the balance against recovery.
74 Ibid. at 412-13.
75 (1978), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. H.C.), aftd (1980), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (Ont. C.A.).
'a (1978), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at 505.
7 Ibid. at 505-06.
78Ibid. at 506.
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Dickson J. was unpersuaded by considerations of this kind. The
first one was considered by him to be, in effect, a change of position
defence.79 It was Dickson J.'s view that the mere expenditure of the
funds by Hydro did not establish the kind of detrimental change of
position necessary to engage that defence.80 With respect to the
second point, Dickson J. suggested that a close examination of the
possible sources of funds needed to discharge its liability to the
plaintiff amounted to the creation of a "means test.""1 Moreover, the
analysis of the possible means by which Ontario Hydro could recoup
its loss was, in his view, rather speculative. With respect to the third
point, Dickson J. reasoned that Craig J. was, in effect, inappropriately
relying on a defence of "voluntary payment." That is to say, it being
Dickson J.'s view that the real reason for denying relief in cases
previously characterized as mistake of law cases was that the plaintiff
had voluntarily made a payment in settlement of an honest claim,
Craig J. appeared to be suggesting that this principle might apply to
the present facts. Ontario Hydro had demanded the money. Nepean
could have investigated its position carefully, but did not do so.
Dickson J. rejected any suggestion of "voluntary payment," however,
on the basis that the principle should have no application "where
there is something in the recipient's conduct 'which shows that he is
the one primarily responsible for the mistake'. .. , In Dickson J.'s
view, "Ontario Hydro was responsible for the proper application and
interpretation of its Act; Ontario Hydro had primary responsibility of
knowing what charges could be imposed upon municipalities and their
utilities, and Ontario Hydro had misled Nepean into thinking that the
charges were properly authorized." 3 In short, if forced to choose
between the right to recover unlawfully extracted levies on the one
hand and a sensitivity to the practical problems faced by public
authorities required to return them, on the other, Dickson J. had a
clear preference for the former.
These two questions - abolition of the mistake of law rule and
recognition of a special defence for public authorities - surfaced
19 The defence of "change of position" in mistaken payments cases was clearly recognized
by the Supreme Court in Rural Municipality ofStorthoaks v. Mobil Oil, [197612 S.C.R.
147. For discussion of the defence, see Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note 4 at 231-36.
8o [1982], 1 S.C.R. 347 at 373.
81 Ibid. at 377.
' Ibid. at 380, quoting Goff & Jones, 2d ed., supra, note 64 at 31.
83 Ibid. at 379.
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before the Court again in Air Canada v. British Columbia4 in 1989.
Although Dickson C.J.C. did not participate in the decision of the
Court, his views with respect to the first question were of considerable
influence. Indeed, a clear majority"5 of the Court were of the view
that the distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law
should be considered to be abolished and felt that it was only
necessary to refer to Dickson J.'s analysis of this point in the Nepean
case in order to support this proposition. With respect to the second
point, however, the majority took a position which would appear to be
antithetical to the views expressed by Dickson J. in Nepean.
In Air Canada, the plaintiff airline sought to recover taxes collected
by the defendant province under an ultra vires statute. The majority
held that although the mistake of law doctrine ought to be considered
abolished, a special defence was nonetheless available to public
authorities in the context of payments made under an ultra vires
statute. It would appear that the kinds of concerns that troubled Craig
J. in Nepean weighed heavily with the majority. These problems, it
was apparently thought, are particularly intense in the context of
ultra vires legislation and accordingly, a special defence in such cases
was considered appropriate. Wilson J. entered a vigorous dissent in
the Air Canada case which is more consistent with the views
expressed by Dickson J. in Nepean. In her view, there is no sound
policy reason for requiring "the individual taxpayer, as opposed to
taxpayers as a whole, [to] bear the burden of government's mis-
take.""6 The law-abiding taxpayer who mistakenly assumes the
validity of the statute and makes the apparently required payment
should be allowed recovery. Any difficulties encountered by the
defendant in making restitution should not, as Dickson J. had
suggested in Nepean, prejudice the plaintiffs claim.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161.
u LaForest, Lamer, L'Heureux-Dub6 and Wilson JJ. Beetz and McIntyre JJ. declined
to comment on the point.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161 at 1215. Perhaps I should add that I find the views of Wilson J.
on this point completely persuasive, notwithstanding my own earlier suggestion that
problems of the kind troubling the Air Canada majority might best be accommodated
by the recognition of a special defence in cases where recovery would lead to "fiscal
chaos." See J.D. McCamus, "Restitutionary Recovery of Moneys Paid Under a Mistake
of Law; Ignorantia Juris in the Supreme Courts of Canada" (1983) 17 U.B.C. L. Rev.
233. Consistently with the view expressed by Wilson J. in Air Canada, I would now
suggest that such problems are best left for resolution under the applicable limitations
rules.
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The precise nature of the majority holding in Air Canada on the
scope of the immunity being granted to public authorities is obscured
by the fact that in that case the defendant province had subsequently
enacted intra vires legislation of retroactive effect which would
effectively recapture the very moneys in dispute. Though it is
unnecessary to explore this point further for present purposes, it may
well be that the proper reading of Air Canada is that moneys paid to
a public authority under an ultra vires statute which is corrected by
intra vires and retroactive legislation are irrecoverable." What is
important for present purposes, of course, is to note that in Air
Canada a -majority of the Court adopted the analysis set forth by
Dickson J. in Nepean on the general question of the abolition of the
mistake of law rule. There seems little doubt that this aspect of the
decision in Air Canada will be "generally welcomed, as a landmark in
the development of a coherent law of restitution in Canada, and as a
model for other jurisdictions."8'
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT: GENERAL PRINCIPLE OR GENERIC CAUSE
OF ACTION?
IT WILL BE EVIDENT FROM THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION that the Chief
Justice, and the Court more generally, have recognized that the unjust
enrichment principle offers a useful general statement of the underly-
ing rationale of much of the old law of quasi-contract and constructive
trust. As such, the principle can usefully serve as an organizational
framework for these two bodies of doctrine and, more importantly, can
provide an analytical framework facilitating the reconsideration of
outdated and anomalous doctrines. But can the unjust enrichment
principle serve as the expression of a new generic cause of action in
restitution cases? More particularly, can the formulation of the
general principle set out by Dickson J. in Pettkus v. Becker89 serve as
the expression of such a generic cause of action? In other words, does
the Dickson opinion in Pettkus v. Becker perform for the law of
restitution the role played in the law of negligence by Lord Atkin's
8 See, generally, Maddaugh & McCamus, supra, note 4 at 273-75; S. Arrowsmith,
"Restitution and Mistake of Law in Canada" (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 28.
u S. Arrowsmith, ibid. at 29.
89 Supra, note 37.
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famous opinion in Donoghue v. Stevenson'? Such questions do not
yield easily to analysis and it may well b.e that some period of time
must pass before confident answers can be formulated. Nonetheless,
there is at least some evidence in the opinions of the Court rendered
in 1989 in Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd.91 in
support of the proposition that in any case where the facts appear to
engage the elements of Dickson J.'s formulation of the unjust
enrichment principle, a claim in unjust enrichment will lie.
The rather complex facts of the Syncrude case can be simplified for
present purposes. Syncrude Canada Ltd. ("Syncrude") had ordered
gear boxes for use in its Alberta oil sands operation on three separate
occasions. The gear boxes were defective and the principal issues in
this litigation related to the suppliers' liability as a result of the
defects and the applicability and enforceability of various exculpatory
clauses. With respect to the third supply contract, however, a
restitutionary problem arose. Syncrude had previously dealt with an
American supplier, Hunter Engineering Company Inc. ("Hunter U.S.").
On the occasion of the third contract, however, Syncrude dealt with
former employees of Hunter U.S. who now represented Hunter
Engineering (Canada) Limited ("Hunter Canada"), a company which
they falsely claimed to be a Canadian subsidiary of Hunter U.S. In
fact, in conducting the business of Hunter Canada, the employees
were acting in what Hunter U.S. viewed as a breach of fiduciary
obligation. On the faith of this false representation, Syncrude entered
into a contract for the supply of eleven gear boxes with Hunter
Canada. As was the case with the previous suppliers, Hunter Canada
sub-contracted the manufacturing of the gear boxes to a company
which may be referred to as ACO. In due course, Hunter U.S.
discovered this fraud and commenced a passing-off action against
Hunter Canada. After discussions with Hunter U.S. and AGO,
Syncrude determined that it would attempt to ensure the supply of
the eleven gear boxes and, at the same time, avoid prejudging the
outcome of the lawsuit brought against Hunter Canada by Hunter
U.S. It attempted to accomplish these two objectives by entering into
two agreements directly with AGO. In the first of these, ACO agreed
to supply the eleven gear boxes directly to Syncrude at the price it
would have been paid by Hunter Canada. In the second, Syncrude
established a trust fund consisting of the moneys it would have been
go [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.). For a suggestion that it does indeed do so, see G.B. Klippert,
UnIjust Enrichment (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) c. 2.
91 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426.
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obliged to pay Hunter Canada under the original supply contract. The
purchase price to be paid to ACO was to be paid out of that fund.
Further, the balance would be allocated, in effect, to the winner of the
lawsuit between Hunter Canada and Hunter U.S. provided - and this
proved to be a point of difficulty - that the payment was contingent
on the recipient of the funds being willing to assume the obligations
of Hunter Canada under the original contract of supply. Those obliga-
tions were greater than those normally assumed by Hunter U.S. in
agreements of this kind. In the event, Hunter U.S. prevailed in its
lawsuit against Hunter Canada and brought a claim in unjust
enrichment against Syncrude for the trust moneys remaining after
payment had been made to ACO. Hunter U.S. refused to assume the
obligations of Hunter Canada under the original contract and, for this
reason, Syncrude refused to make the requested payment.
The claim in unjust enrichment brought by Hunter U.S. enjoyed
success in the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 2 Anderson J.A.
suggested that the correct mode of analysis was simply to apply the
various elements of the unjust enrichment formula set out by Dickson
J. in Pettkus v. Becker to the facts at hand. Thus, as the facts
established "1. An enrichment of the defendant; 2. A corresponding
deprivation of the plaintiff; 3. The absence of a juristic reason for the
enrichment,"93 Hunter U.S. should be entitled to recover the fund,
provided that it would be willing to assume the warranty obligations
under the Hunter Canada agreement. Otherwise, Syncrude would
enjoy a windfall benefit at the expense of Hunter U.S. Though this
decision was overruled by a divided Supreme Court, the important
point for present purposes is that neither Dickson C.J.C. who wrote
for the majority, nor Wilson J. in dissent, disagreed with the approach
taken by Anderson J.A. in applying the Pettkus unjust enrichment
formula to the facts at hand as if it stated the elements of a cause of
action.
For Dickson C.J.C., however, the elements of unjust enrichment
were not established on these facts. As Hunter U.S. was unwilling to
assume the warranty obligations undertaken by Hunter Canada,
Syncrude would not receive an important service for which it had
bargained. In such circumstances, Syncrude could not be said to be
unjustly enriched. Further, Hunter U.S. could not, in Dickson C.J.C.'s
view, have a better claim against Syncrude with respect to the
92 (1985), 68 B.C.L.R. 367 (C.A.).
93 Ibid. at 382.
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proceeds of the original contract than could Hunter Canada itself.
Hunter Canada had no such entitlement because the original
agreement had been, in effect, rescinded by Syncrude on the basis of
Hunter Canada's fraudulent misrepresentation. In such circumstances,
none of the elements of the unjust enrichment were made out.
Wilson J., on the other hand, took a rather different view of the
extent to which Syncrude had received what it had bargained for. It
was her opinion that "Hunter U.S. would be liable under both the
Hunter Canada warranty and the implied statutory warranty,"94 and
accordingly that Syncrude would be in the position of having received
precisely what it had originally bargained for and, at the same time,
would retain the windfall of the profit that Hunter Canada would
have made under the agreement, a windfall which it would be
obtaining at the expense of Hunter U.S. No purpose would be served
in the present context by exploring at greater length the important
difference of opinion between Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson J. on the
question of whether Hunter U.S. would in fact assume warranty
liability of a kind equivalent to that assumed by Hunter Canada under
the original contract. Nor is it necessary to explore here the important
difference of opinion between them on the question of whether a third
party (Hunter U.S.) could have a better claim to monies payable by
one party (Syncrude) to another (Hunter Canada) under an agreement
between them than could the party to whom they were payable
(Hunter Canada) under the original agreement.9" Again, what is of
particular interest in the present context is that both Dickson C.J.C.
and Wilson J. appear to assume that a plausible claim in unjust
enrichment is properly pleaded and argued simply on the basis of the
Pettkus unjust enrichment formula. Thus, for Dickson C.J.C., the
claim did not fail because of its lack of a toe-hold in earlier restitution-
ary case law. Rather, a careful analysis of the relationships of the
parties, one to another, suggested that the Pettkus formula was not
met on these facts. In the Syncrude opinions, then, the Supreme Court
seems to have moved a considerable distance in the direction of
recognizing the unjust enrichment principle not merely as a statement
9' [1989] 1 S.C.R. 426 at 521.
9' These issues are explored elsewhere at some length by the present writer. See J.D.
McCamus, supra, note 50.
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of principle or underlying rationale but, rather, as the expression of
a "rule" or generic cause of action.9
V. CONCLUSION
THE OPINIONS RENDERED by Chief Justice Dickson on matters relating
to the law of restitution thus offer a rich harvest. Indeed, it is difficult
to estimate, at this point in time, what their full impact might
ultimately be. At the present time, however, a number of concrete
achievements can be identified. First, in Pettkus v. Becker, the Chief
Justice authoritatively brought the equitable half of the restitutionary
family within the framework of the unjust enrichment analysis. The
beneficial organizational and developmental consequences that are
thought by many to flow from the adoption of the unjust enrichment
analysis were briefly portrayed at the beginning of this article. It has
now been clearly confirmed that the advantages of the unjust
enrichment analysis extend to relevant equitable doctrines in addition
to those of quasi-contract. Second, two important modifications to the
existing doctrine - the recognition of the Pettkus matrimonial
property cause of action and the abolition of the mistake of law rule
- are plainly Chief Justice Dickson's handiwork. Both of these
developments effect important changes in the legal treatment of
significant public policy issues. Third, in Sorochan, the Chief Justice
stated that, in a restitution case, the question of the type of relief -
whether personal or proprietary - to be awarded should be divorced
from the threshold question of determining whether an unjust
enrichment has occurred. This is a development of very considerable
importance. An opportunity has been created to reconsider the
alignment of the restitutionary remedies with the various individual
causes of action and to deal with remedial questions in a more flexible
manner. Indeed, it has been suggested here that an opportunity has
been provided to effect a merger of the remedial doctrines of common
law and equity in this important area of private law. Finally, the
analytical approach taken in the Syncrude case, when coupled with
the unjust enrichment analysis set forth in the Pettkus decision,
strongly suggests that we have moved in Canada to a situation in
which "the law will afford a remedy for unjust enrichment in the
" This general question is considered at greater length in Maddaugh & McCarous,
supra, note 4 at 21-27 and in McCamus, supra, note 50.
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absence of valid judicial policy militating against it."97 One suspects
that Chief Justice Dickson would find himself in general agreement
with the following observations of Professor John P. Dawson, a
distinguished American restitution scholar:
My own conclusion is that restitution remedies in our law have a roving commission.
The generalizations now built around them and the techniques they provide have
implications that reach in every direction, in unsuspected ways. No area is marked off
as exempt. We have not yet absorbed all the contributions they have made or foreseen
those still in the making.9
Certainly, the capacity of the unjust enrichment analysis to play the
role envisaged by Professor Dawson in Canadian law has been much
enhanced by Chief Justice Dickson's restitution opinions. If the law of
restitution has become the most interesting and challenging aspect of
Canadian private law, as I believe it has, this development is, in large
measure, the result of the enormous contribution made to this field by
Chief Justice Dickson.
g' White v. Central Trust Co. (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 236 at 245 per LaForest J.A.
(N.B.C.A.).
"J.P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951) at 117.
